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Ethereum is almost certainly the number 2 coin in comedy gold. It will likely surpass Bitcoin in comedy gold long before it passes it in market cap. Thanks in large part to a spam-based marketing campaign on Reddit, it also has a dedicated base of critics. After its IPO, it was known as “Inthereum” for a while, infinitely powerful of course, as vaporware can do anything. It had a major version release, then another. Finally, a major smart contract, in terms of valuation, came along: The DAO. Not to be confused with other DAOs, before and after. The DAO was the biggest. It was going to be the best; it already was the best! Euphoria was off the charts. Until just a few months in, a bug was found. And the killer app became the flash point. What could they do? Well, hard fork and give the money back, of course! And so they did. “Code is Law”; but this is actually good for Ethereum because “[a]lthough some do question the analogy ‘code is law’. I do not. We just found out that we have a supreme court, the community!”  After the D'OH, Ethereum struggles to top its ATH comedy gold, but there is still a bright future for popcorn and comedy gold from Ethereum.
5 Largest Veins of Comedy Gold
Here are the largest comedy gold veins in Ethereum in potential reserves in our estimation in approximately descending order:
Cultlike euphoria - Now, this can certainly be said to be common to almost all cryptocurrencies. But Ethereum seems special here, even more than Bitcoin's community. There is a real belief here that this coin is going to change the world. This helps play into a "this is very good for Ethereum" mindset, wherein even the D'OH fork was a great success!
Vitalik Buterin - The best name in cryptocurrency! Young genius central to Ethereum and almost universally seen as the most important leader in the project. In our view, his endorsement and leadership during the D'OH fork led to that route being taken. That is, we believe if he had opposed it from the start, he may have been able to prevent it or at least have led to what is now called ETC being the dominant of the two.
And so in our view, Mr. Buterin runs a billion dollar cryptocurrency right now. He and his team seem to have done reasonably well so far; it seems likely they'll continue to thrive. To the best of my knowledge, confirmed on /ethereum, there hasn't been a drug market implemented in Ethereum or trading with ETH so far. But while it seems like a terrible idea, because of the lack of privacy and proven mutability of contracts, it seems like eventually there's going to be a major drug market accepting ETH just because it has such a high value. And, they point out, monero and zcoin’s core privacy feature will apparently be available on ETH after this next fork, so look forward to anonymous ETH fueling drug markets! And then the interesting question will be raised of how Chief Justice Buterin will rule on the case, whether it is worthy of an intervention or not. If not a drug market, then another buggy and hacked contract. Or a hacked exchange, and the question of whether to make it or its users whole, or "let the hacker win".
DAOs - From the beginning, it was proposed that Ethereum itself and its reserve fund would be turned into a DAO. How exactly this was going to happen would be figured out later of course. There was an initial estimate of 2016 for the transition.
Of course, in 2016, The DAO and the D'OH happened. I'm not aware of a current further push to put all of ETH's future funding into a DAO. But I'm sure the topic will resurface. And it will be hilarious on so many levels. The DAO actually collapsed too soon for peak comedy gold extraction. It had been predicted that there would be no consensus on any proposals and that nothing would be funded, and that there would be gold from that. But it was just a few months in when the bug was found. And while the D'OH fork was certainly a rich vein of comedy gold, it wasn't as rich as what the DAO could have been if it had floundered around for a year or so before the hack. Surprisingly, there's actually a running, apparently working DAO on ETH that was started even before The DAO: digixDAO. If it keeps on running, it will continue to be hilarious as other DAOs fail to learn from it. If it fails, there's all the more hilarity for Ethereum, making it the platform where anything complicated enough to look like an original use case will break. The very existence of digix is proof-of-comedy-gold.
Immutability - The whole central notion of immutability is going to be a recurring question for Ethereum after the D'OH. While there was a lot of sentiment of "just this once and never again" at the time, there will someday be another major issue, and the precedent will mean that at least a major debate among the community will be had. Ethereum is "mostly immutable". Bitcoin is far better protected here, because while it's true they've hard forked to fix a bug before, that was years ago and the community is far more fractured now. Ethereum has a demonstrated capacity to do both routine and controversial hard forks. This strength is also a challenge, as it will invite constant legal and ethical questions about when it's appropriate to modify the chain itself with a fork: that is, rolling back some or all transactions after major bugs, thefts, frauds, and so forth.
Concentration of funds - This one I'm just guessing at. Although rich lists do exist, obviously one entity like an exchange could pool funds in an address without one person owning that much, or one person could splits their coins among many accounts. But it gives a rough guide. In Bitcoin, the top 113 addresses, having more than 10,000 BTC, in total are 17.46% of the current supply [ 2 ]. And in Ethereum, it's true that the top two accounts are marked as exchange accounts [ 3 ]. Still, having lots of funds concentrated in a single exchange wallet seems to still have some potential for comedy gold. In Ethereum, the top 50 addresses have more than double the proportion of the top 113 in Bitcoin, a bit over 40% of the current supply. My guess would be there are still a lot of people who invested heavily in the initial ICO who have held onto a significant portion of their initial ETH. While some of these top addresses are exchanges, I think there are probably many individuals represented in here as well, and every one of them is a multimillionaire from this account alone.
Of course, so far, because ETH is still smaller than BTC in overall market cap, these top addresses aren't as huge as the top addresses in Bitcoin in current market value. But if ETH were to overtake BTC's current position with a relatively unchanged distribution, there would be some real comedy gold coming off this factor. Cribs could have a spin-off Ethereum series. This concentration was a part of making The D'OH what it was in my view as well: in Bitcoin, there would never have been so much of the coin tied up in one particular venture, at least not now. But in Ethereum, this concentration and groupthink can combine to hilarious effect.
A Brief History of Comedy Gold in Ethereum:
“Laws, like sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as we know how they are made” - John Godfrey Saxe In the beginning, there was an offering. The greatest coin the world had ever seen; step right up and buy it! There was even code; this is no vaporware! Sure, there was more work to be done, but the ICO would fund that work, the founders would get a little, and create a reserve for the future and the rest would be mineable. There was also some of the most vociferous objections on BCT, declaring that the stake allocated to the founders was too large, pointing to other coins which had done smaller or done without. Arguing against the reserve; arguing against having a presale at all. Some people, of course, completely failing to read the documentation accurately to see what was even being proposed. And an almost complete radio silence from this large team working around the clock on Ethereum. It took some months from when the initial ANN was made until the sale actually started, but by the time they had their sale, they had perhaps the best documentation at launch to-date. Of course, there were some areas which seemed to lack some detail, like the budgeting, but never mind that, it was finally launching! Launching the sale, at least. In July and August of 2014, Ether was first sold. It was described as “fuel” for the virtual machine they were going to build [ 4 ]. And then, a year later, Ethereum was released live. By July 2016, it had already had its first major crisis after The DAO was hacked and the D’OH fork introduced in response. But the fact that Ethereum was ever released, and that it was released so quickly, is truly incredible. There was more than one person who thought that the stated goals of Ethereum were not possible. And, of course, many initial goals and deadlines didn’t happen. But unlike the railbirds on BCT were convinced, the team did not fail nor did it run off with the money. They were given a blank check, and they actually delivered a working product which has been successful so far financially. Of course, having its flagship smart contract go belly-up quite so quickly after having finally gotten a “killer app” seems rather unfortunate. The oracle problem (the question of how to reliably relate smart contracts to the outside world) seems unresolved, but partial solutions are inevitable and can only serve to make increasingly complex and thus popcorn-loaded contracts possible. Right now, all seems relatively quiet. But rest assured, there remains plenty of euphoria and gas to drive many more cycles of comedy gold production. Ether huffers need something to throw their ETH at. The more complicated; the better! Given some of the creations that have been made in NXT, for instance, a few more years of creativity on ETH should yield some very complicated and pop-corn rich smart contracts.
I was relaxing in my office, waiting for business. It was a dingy little one-room affair, but it would serve for now. Particularly with no clients. I had poured myself a double shot, and was about to enjoy it, when suddenly the door opened. A man walked in, familiar somehow although I couldn't place him. I reached out my hand instinctively, and instead of shaking it, he handed me a dollar. "Hello?" He pointed at the sign in the window, advertising a promotional one dollar gold survey for the first client. Always astute, I quickly surmised he wished to hire me. "Of course, sir! What coin would you like?" "Ethereum." "Certainly! And may I have your name for the log?" "Tyler Durdan." And with that, my newest client left. I downed my double and poured a generous triple to follow it. This was going to be a long day. Ethereum was the ultimate prize in my line of work. The coin which proved the adage that truth is stranger than fiction; which had proved itself a lucrative source of comedy gold. And who am I? Guy Noir, private comedy gold surveyor. I've seen things you people wouldn't believe. Premined scamcoins crashing on noname exchanges. I watched popcorn glitter in the dark on forgotten the BCT threads. Popcorn junkies strung out on a high, and I've delivered them more comedy gold, popcorn, salt and butter. There is never enough. A dark night in a world that never sleeps and knows how to keep its secrets...But on the 12th Floor of the Acme Building, one man is still trying to find the answers to life's persistent questions: Guy Noir, private comedy gold surveyor. Thank you, Narrator. Now, as I was saying, Ethereum is overloaded with gold. But the core is pretty straightforward: Ethereum promised "smart contracts". Immutable. Turing-complete. This was what Bitcoin lacked. The bee's knees. Crypto 2.0. What could go wrong? We'll skip over the "Inthereum" period. Perhaps the vaporware criticism was never fair: from their version, they had Proof-of-Concept code; they went through some iterations and eventually got to release. Let's note clearly that there was plenty of time to determine some sort of official policy for what to do about a buggy or improperly written contract losing money. In Bitcoin, every hack has been a SFYL event, although it’s true that a bug in the coin itself was hard forked away before. Mt. Gox tried to blame malleability, but there was never a fork to try to recover funds. In Ethereum, immutability was often talked about. So far as I saw in skimming, “what if” scenarios to undo bugs wasn’t brought up front-and-center. Nor was immutability being debated that I saw. So Ethereum releases. A major contract is launched, The DAO, which gets an astonishing portion of ETH invested. The world's largest crowd sale as they ultimately called it. All the major players in ETH buy into it, including Vitalik Buterin, the creator of Ethereum and the best name in cryptocurrency. Just as they're starting to get into the comedy gold that The DAO doesn't really have a purpose, a bug is discovered. And just as its leader is assuring everyone that no funds are at risk, the funds start being drained out of the contract by an unknown party. And suddenly immutable means "immutable unless we screw up on the biggest contract which everyone important has invested in heavily". Ethereum ultimately hard-forks to return investor funds and basically unwind The DAO. After claiming that the bug was in the contract, the coin itself is hard forked to fix the issue. And the first Ethereum clone results, one which simply does not follow the new hard fork. So the natural question is: when can a contract be changed? In the first page of the Ethereum launch, this question was implied by asking about what would happen if there were an assassination market hosted by a smart contract on Ethereum. Of course, in reality, Ethereum is not really functional enough at present to enforce such a contract, but the question remains in case Ethereum were to actually attain a functioning smart contract platform. Attempted reference to Tears in rain monologue, credit to Rutger Hauer Guy Noir and narrator text lovingly stolen from Prairie Home Companion's Guy Noir, by Garrison B. Keillor.
Filed for psych eval Twenty pages into the BCT ANN, I believe I have contracted cancer, again. I’m reminded of why I don’t generally go on BCT. As bad as altcoin forums tend to be for their circlejerking, it’s almost better than the, well, there’s really no way to put it other than FUD that inevitably appears in response to anything. Of course, it’s not paid shilling so much as it is willful and vocal ignorance. For all the critiques in that thread, most of them are utter nonsense and simply are misreading the initial information. On the other hand, it’s January 27th in the thread by now, with February 1st and the pre-sale start, and they don’t have their “prospectus” up yet. I also haven’t seen the change in mining rate yet. Side note: eMunie; wtf? I guess I missed something? Either it’s gone through a namechange or it’s dead, because a quick coinmarketcap search didn’t find anything. A comedy gold mining project for another day. Great; spoiler alert: fundraiser delayed apparently, so even more cancer to read through in that thread on the way to getting to a prospectus! The first 44 pages of the thread was summarized thus: “I want to believe. Why are you not speaking to us? Throw me a bone. Just tell me what I want to hear, and I'll gladly throw my money in.” [ 5 ] Would that I had only had to read that quote rather than all 44 pages, and facing many more. Pages and comments dragged on as I waded through the low-grade popcorn. When would this prospectus be released, so my torment would end? Oh god: a side-thread shows that by the time they get to April, there’s still no prospectus or presale date or estimate of when there may be a date [ 6 ]. It’s time to give up on reading through the cancerous mainthread on BCT and start jumping ahead pages to find the pre-sale and prospectus. Okay, finally, in July, they release documents and start the sale [ 7 ]. Good enough. I have mountains of links on my desk. Comedy gold is overflowing, but this is a survey expedition, not a mining operation. But by the time it’s surveyed, there’s always so much gold lined up to mine it gets hard to leave it behind and leave with the samples. It’s time to hammer out some copy and close this file. Folks, we hope you’ve enjoyed this descent into madness and comedy gold brought to you by the Comedy Gold Survey Company and our patron Tyler Durden. Do you need more comedy gold in your life? Of course you do! So please donate today; every $1 helps! I’ve added a new special: $5 lets you choose the next coin to be surveyed! Thanks again to Tyler Durden, and I will now be re-watching Fight Club and questioning my sanity. Cheers y’all! Resources:
[ 6 ] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=448923.msg6438910#msg6438910 - April 28th, 2014; Ursium says “We won't issue further comments regarding the Ether Sale, until we have completely finalized the framework for it. In the meantime enjoy the free technology, people are already building apps on it, which is exciting Smiley” ; this official Q&A thread then abandoned; these guys clearly hates BCT as much as I do
[ ] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=412878.msg4497464#msg4497464 charleshoskinson, January 14th, 2014; “Current plans are for a 60 day fundraiser, starting from Miami on; however, we are still exploring this and thus will set something in stone closer to the conference.” - fundraiser launches in less than a month but date not even set yet; also “No, the rate of inflation is always decreasing and comparable with bitcoin.” and “In terms of ROI, this should be reflected with a positive ROI.” ; also “As for P2P exchange, we have a close relationship with Open Transactions and combined with a namecoin style contract provided in the whitepaper and bitmessage makes a significantly more efficient distributive exchange than is possible with BitShares. Trust is not required as auditing can be done on Ethereum blockchain and we wouldn't suffer any bloat. “
[ ] https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper - Accessed Feb 12, 2017; shows a different version of the issuance model, including the variable presale price modification and reduced future mining. But constant mining reward is still shown and fixed.
[ ] https://forum.ethereum.org/discussion/2007/whitepaper-pdf - Thread from April 2015 where Stephen Tual says changes in whitepaper were “as to how significant these were, probably not much”; “We had a hosted copy of the WP on our .org website, but that is now pointing to the github (as the pdf, by definition, was static).”
[ ] https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,1854.0.html Thread which goes into Bytemaster response to initial Ethereum proposal; points out that running something complicated like Bitshares on Ethereum would be cost prohibitive. Also predicts Ethereum becomes PoS.
[ ] https://github.com/slockit/DAO “Our Standard DAO Framework allows people to create Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) governed by the code in this repository written immutably to the blockchain.”
[ ] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=428589.msg4690140#msg4690140 - “I think this whole project will get forced underground onto the Tor network in short order because the illegal stuff will be in the blockchain instead of externalized. It will have to directly compete with bitcoin with both hands tied behind its back because it will be hard for people to even find a safe copy of the program to download. Am I to understand that you will not have a legal opinion supporting what you are doing?” - Seth Otterstad
[ ] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=428589.msg4718951#msg4718951 “We will switch our PoW from Dagger to a hybrid PoW/PoS system to be developed via a bountied competition conducted by our university partners and open to the general community for participation. The terms will be announced in late february including judges, specifications and the university partners.” - jubalix quoting some Ethereum promotional document
[ ] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=428589.msg4740396#msg4740396 “Creating the platform with new features is one thing. Competing in the real world of hype, adoption, and social marketing with Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Dogecoin is a completely different beast. Especially, when every coin is based on ever changing software. The software is secondary to the marketing and socialization at this stage in the ballgame.” - DieJohnny
Does anyone recall the $ amount of Augur rep during the crowdsale? I'm aware of the 15% bonus initially, but I can't find the actual value. Also, I understand the function of DAO for Slock, but haven't looked too much into Rep for Augur. Are they similar in terms of receiving "dividends," voting rights, etc? Also, for REP holders, has your investment kept up pace with ETH's price or is it a much better ROI?
The Crowdsale Analyst: ether.camp - the altruistic hackathon platform?
ether.camp is launching their crowdsale in just two days hack.ether.camp/sale. This is one of the most loudly debated projects in recent weeks, mainly because of their 50 million USD cap on the crowdsale. 50 million? Yes, they have actually put a cap at 50 million on this thing. I don't know Roman Mandeleil and have never used any of the products ether.camp have developed, so I'm looking at this crowdsale purely based on the information given on the website, the white paper, the ether.camp blog and recent ether.camp Reddit discussions. I'm very subjectively scoring each section on a scale of 1 to 5, where 3 should be neutral in the eyes of a potential investor.
Project: ether.camp crowdfund
As described in the white paper:
ether.camp is a project aimed to create the ideal innovation environment for startups by utilising blockchain technology for the release of the Virtual Accelerator.
ether.camp is a recurring hackathon event, with the second hackathon coming up shortly. According to a blog post they have 1700 hackers and fans (what does that mean?) signed up for the event. Before the event developers have been able to pitch ideas and form teams, and the goal during the five week event is to create products out of these ideas.
Do these guys have what it takes to succeed as entrepreneurs? Track record and previous projects? Experience and formal education? 1/5 This is tricky - because the only publicly known member of ether.camp is Roman Mandeleil. After a software dev career he join the Ethereum project and was the EthereumJ (Java client) lead developer in 2014, after which he left to start ether.camp. At ether.camp he has led several Ethereum based projects, such as Ethereum Studio, Ethereum Harmony, Ethereum Java Peer and live.ether.camp. To my knowledge none of these are commercial projects, so we have no real information about the teams ability to run a commercial platform. Roman has delivered on several projects and seems very well respected in the community (as seen by the judges they have attracted to the ether.camp hackathon). But, there is no mention and no information about the team in the white paper which is a huge miss. As I've said before - the team and their ability to execute on product, business and company formation is the absolutely most important part of any project. During the recent Reddit AMA several red flags was raised from my perspective: * Roman said there is a dedicated team solely working on hack.ether.camp - but on the hack.ether.camp web site only two people are listed to work on hack.ether.camp (Mikhail Kalinin and Anton Maximov) * ether.camp governance, or lack thereof as stated by Roman in the AMA:
is private company so we keep the inernal strucure private for now. I can be seen as a responsible for any project we do. Since the team is the most important success factor this lack of transparency is a huge issue for me.
I'm sure Roman is a very competent person, but the answers given does not provide any assurance. This part of their proposal is downright bad.
Market Potential 1/5
In the AMA the answer to monetization of the platform is very vague:
(Q) Thanks for your answers. As a follow up: Do you automatically expect the great user experience and startup ideas to turn into revenue and salaries for your team to go forward? Revenue is crucial for the sustainability of any business in the world - be it blockchain or normal. (A) I do agree that revenue is crucial for any buisness, but a startup can focus on the platform for some time and leave the monetization part for later. Google and Facebook are just 2 examples of such a story.
So no market vision in sight, which is another problem even if there surely are ways to monetise a successful platform. But, since this is not on the map currently we can at least be sure this is some (a long) time into the future.
Product/Business/Operating Plan 2/5
Proof of concept available? How many iterations are done? MVP available? Is the product validated by outside users? 2/5 The first hackathon is already done, but I cannot find any information on the website that describes the outcome of this event. Did any of the projects or teams live on after the event? For the Virtual Accelerator platform itself it seems like some code is available github. But, the web site and white paper are still (2 days before the sale goes live) not complete and has only empty space where they are supposed to put code examples. But, since 50 % of all funds raised will go to platform development (from 0.5 to 25 million USD) this platform clearly has a lot of work left to do. What is the current operating plan and why do they need funding now? 1/5 They need funding in order to continue run the ether.camp hackathons, continue to expand their scope and finish development of the platform. But, very weak arguments are given for why they need money now and how much they really need. In the minimum funding scenario (still a wide span of 1-5 million USD) they say they will focus on platform development and move quickly to platform monetisation, which in my opinion sounds like a sound idea as it will show the viability of the platform as a commercial project sooner rather than later. Further, I have serious doubts about the ability the use funds efficiently given the very wide span they go for. Let's say they reach the max of 50 million USD, in this case 25 million USD goes to platform development. The website says they will spend this over three years before financing the platform with monetisation. 25 million USD equals a staff over 104 people (given a cost of $80 000 per employee per year) over the full three years on platform development alone - and this is for a platform without any public road map, vision or goals. Another lacking point is that they have no plan or description of the team they are aiming to build. How many people are they going to recruit? In which positions? Who will the people leading this venture be? What is the go-to market strategy? 0/5 None in the white paper, which needs addressing. Roadmap 2/5 A roadmap for the 2nd hackathon is given, but none for the platform development or other activities for which they raise money.
Do they have a clear view of the competition? How do they plan to beat them? 3/5 They don't address the competition directly, but given the level of interest in the hack.ether.camp I would say this is the most well known hackathon in the Ethereum space. However, the ambition is clearly to reach outside of the Ethereum space and no clear strategy or who will be responsible for this is given.
Is valuation sane? 1/5 For some reason I cannot understand they have chosen to set a maximum cap in the fundraise of 50 million USD. Five Zero Zero Zero Zero Zero Zero Zero dollars. They describe their project as doable with as little as 1 million USD, but have set the mega cap in order to avoid a crowdsale that ends in minutes, hours or days. Also, it's very important to note that the HKG token does not entitle to anything on the ether.camp platform ether.camp blog:
As it’s important for us to comply with US security regulations backers don’t have rights on any other part of the project - no IP, no revenue stream and no shared ownership.
The only right given to holders of the HKG token is the possibility to participate in the first phase of crowdfunding for projects in ether.camp hackathons and vote on the use of funds in these projects. As a token holder you can be an early adopter in hackathon projects, by exchanging HKG tokens for specific tokens released by the project (if I understand it correctly). This way the project gets HKG tokens that can be sold (for seed funding) and the token holder is now a first round investor in the project. This process is a 1:1 exchange between HKG tokens and project tokens. After the hackathon event the project can release 5 times as many tokens as released in the first round and these tokens will be available to the public for ether. Nothing is said about the pricing mechanism for this, or how the project will be able to mint and sell additional tokens at a later stage for further funding. Or does it stop there? This whole process seems a bit unpolished and not complete. Also, nothing says the project tokens will have any value at all. This means that the value of HKG tokens will come solely from what people are willing to pay for them in exchanges for the ability to participate as early adopters/backers in future hackathon events. This value will be balanced by the selling pressure from all hackathon projects selling HKG tokens in exchange for ethebitcoin in order to fund their projects. Crowdsale and token structure 1/5 The crowdsale mechanism itself also have several of the usual issues we have seen in the space: * All money is available upfront * No way of raising more funds through the HKG token, either if the project have difficulties or if it becomes a huge success * Investor vesting is not even considered since there is no issuance of tokens to the ether.camp team - meaning there is a very low level of alignment of interest with the crowdsale backers. If the max cap is only set because they want to give anyone interested the possibility to join, this could have been solved in so many other ways (e.g. pro-rata issuance, Dutch auction or something else) and instead they could have put a sane cap of 2-3 million USD which would still be a lot of money for a project like this.
As an investor? 4/5 As noted above they have taken care to avoid being considered an SEC security. However, this is not mentioned in the white paper or on the sale website, only in a blog post. Legality of the business 5/5 Nothing strange here
Proof of external security evaluation? 2/5 To my knowledge one external security audit has been made, which was made public today (2 days before the sale starts) by Manuel Araoz Zeppelin Medium. To me it looks a bit like the security audit published by Slockit on theDAO. They go through one of the contracts and give some general and some specific comments on the code. So far so good. What I don't like is that they start the audit by saying:
We’ve been asked by our friends at ether.camp to review the code for their soon-to-launch Hacker Gold (HKG) token, and to publish the results of our work.
I would like security audits to be performed by hired, professional unrelated external auditors, not friends of the team. Further than that, what is interesting is not to only audit one specific contract, but how all contracts interrelate should also be audited. EDIT: The Zeppelin team contacted me and explained they were in fact hired to do the audit, it was just the blog post that had an misleading introduction. Special security needs for this project? 3/5 In general I would say no. But, given the extreme max cap on this projects it makes it another to big to fail project (if they raise the full amount). Can the community afford another security breakdown of this size?
With the information available in these sources I have a very hard time understanding this project. They have a nice website and clearly ambitious plans, but they do not seem connected to reality. The tone I see in Romans AMA answers remind me of the tone Stephan Tual held before TheDAO debacle. I think a lot more openness, transparency and community engagement is needed. Roman also seem to be respected in the community, but this is not translated into any of the background info of the crowdsale. I have several direct issues with the project: * They don't give backgrounds of the team and only two people seems to be working on the project * They don't give any information about the governance of the company that will be in control of all funds * Very vague rationale for how investors will get an ROI on their investment * They have no strategy for how funds will be efficiently used in the wide range they are asking for * No company formation strategy, no market strategy described and no plan for an efficient team setup * The only security audit so far is done by a friend of the project/team * The token issuance model could have been made much better in order to allocate funds to everyone interested * The white paper and the website are still unfinished and are missing content On the other hand, a successful ether.camp could mean a lot to the Ethereum ecosystem. I just wish they could follow some of the best practices developed in the real world. Raise some seed money, build a first version, prove that the team can execute and then go from there. Another important note, it seems like the HKG tokens and the project tokens they potentially can be exchanged into are never intended to carry any value - meaning that investing in ether.camp is not to be done if an ROI is expected on the investment. Read on Medium for better typography Edit: Security section, I was contacted by the Zeppelin team with some additional info (they were hired to do the audit) tips: 0x45eDe61e0EAF2Db9480A2000Efef67B0F4f3A8b0
As a DAO token holder, when I first heard that the DAO had been hacked I thought all the money was permanently gone. That was a bad feeling I felt not just for myself, but for the entire Ethereum community and the hope and promise of The DAO. When I heard there was a time lock, and soft and hard fork options to fix the problem, the pendulum swung the other way and I once again became overly confident in the tech, and falsely concluded there would be a painless 'fix.' However, thanks to the good work of Emin Gun Sirer, I realized just how many unexplored issues there actually were – technical, legal, social, governanace related, etc. I have posted his thoughts from his NY Meetup PPT below, and would encourage everyone to take a quick look them. We were talking about this in our Portland Ethereum meetup, and let's face it, mistakes were made by Slock.it, AND Solidity was not tested enough and ready for roll out, and we all made a mistake rushing ahead. We are all responsible for this mess. We all need to realize there are no good options here. But, if we can work together to find a distributed solution where we all share some of the pain, and come to an agreement collectively, that would be the least bad option. I first was attracted to the soft fork, but the more I learned about it, I realized it was temporary, would take extraordinary measures and cooperation from miners, which is not their original agreement and not what they signed up to do, and then it would only lock up the tokens, not recover them. Then the hacker joined the white hat draining of the DAO, which suddenly seemed like an endless loop, until we would further have to select white hats who would be allowed to transfer the tokens but nobody else would. It seemed to be a rabbit hole that became more temporary, and more convoluted, requiring an increasing number of actions that violated our core principles the further we pursued it. All of this is bad for the Ethereum Foundation and the future of the Ethereum. The idea of the soft fork quickly appeared a good temporary but bad intermediate and horrible long run option. I then felt that a hard fork was the only solution, but honestly that was strongly influenced by the idea that a hacker stealing $50m is bad short run, and it's bad long run, so the worst option. I have been involved with Ethereum for about a year, and must admit I did not come from the Bitcoin community, but from the currency mechanics and payments community, and was originally intrigued only by what might be possible using smart contracts, so that’s what I want to protect, and the real long run value for me. When I spoke with my technical friends who had come from the Bitcoin community, they really, really did not like the hard fork, and felt it would be better to let the hacker walk. I listened to them carefully, and changed my mind. I also realized that for most people in our community, either hard forking or letting the hacker walk was the worst option, with the other being the second worst option, and soft fork being the third worst option. From game theory and life, I have learned the longer this goes on, and the closer it gets to the time lock expiring, the higher probability for additional unexpected bad outcomes, unforeseen forks in the road, which I am sure the hacker is working furiously on. The quicker this is resolved, the better for everyone, maybe even the hacker. The soft fork should not lull us into complacency, but be a temporary measure of days and weeks, not longer. Ultimately, I realized the least bad option is to setup a binary outcome, where we agree to either pay a bounty to the hacker by a specific date, or if he is unreasonable, then go ahead and implement a hard fork. If it doesn't work, at least we tried, and I think the effort will count for something in the long run. As long as this decision happens before the time lock expires, the hacker knows a hard fork has been agreed to and is definitely coming, and the decision date is firm, the hacker's best outcome is to accept the bounty in exchange for releasing the rest of the ETH. Maybe the hacker would prefer to force the community into a hard fork due to antisocial or anti-Ethereum motives, but money is a powerful motivator. I know, people will not like negotiating or appeasing a hacker, but if we take responsibility collectively for this problem, our problem, that we all created, then this is the least bad solution, for the following reasons:
It avoids the worst (or second worst) option of a hard fork.
It avoids the second worst (or worst) option of the hacker walking away with $50m ETH.
It makes everyone pay a price, so avoids in some measure the moral dilemma problem.
It's the only negotiated solution, which can’t be understated how valuable and important that could be for our leaderless community.
It protects the Ethereum foundation and the miners from having to violate core principles to save slock.it's bad coding, or from being tempted to collude with the hacker.
Paying for bounties is part of the software ecosystem, and although the number is big in real terms, it's still just a number.
It solves the problem quickly, and as cleanly as possible. Again, there are no good options.
The key to negotiating is not focusing on what the hacker gets, which in this case will just make you frustrated and angry, but rather focus on what the community gets, the least bad option that maybe prevents the community from splitting into two camps. That alone is maybe the most important thing to me personally, and to others I know. Ethereum is still young, and as a community we have important challenges ahead; let’s put this behind us with minimal damage ASAP. That’s what taking responsibility collectively in practice really means. If you agree, then we simply need to set a price. I think I read someone else had proposed 5%, which is a relatively painless learning lesson for each of us individually, but a sizable and potentially life changing bounty for the hacker(s). Remember, it won't work unless the incentive to play nice is substantial. We have all had time to think about this and mull over the options, but now we need to find the will to come together and create a solution, the least bad solution. I say pay the bounty in exchange for returning the DAO tokens, kill the DAO 1.0, and be done with it. What say you? Gaming the DAO Emin Gün Sirer Department of Computer Science Cornell University Posted with permission. Thx Emin! DACs • Decentralized Autonomous Corporations/Orgs are incredibly powerful and promising • A computer program, with its own code and state, that can programmatically manage money flows • The entire behavior of the program is pre-ordained • Brand new era, with brand new functionality DAO Promise • Automate and eliminate the middlemen • Achieve far higher efficiencies o A hedge fund with 0% overhead? • Self-policing and/or self-arbitrating o Can’t eliminate the legal system, but can handle simple cases • Bring complete transparency to the operation of a company or trust o Insurance o Finance • Killer apps are yet to come... DAO Unknowns Is it actually possible to build secure, functional smart-contracts? • What about the fine print you see on regular contracts? • What’s in the fine print? • How to form the contract covenant The spirit of the agreement How to resolve disputes • How to modify the contract • How to terminate The DAO, as we will see, messed up almost all of these Enter The DAO • Usurped the phrase “The DAO” for a specific investment fund • Part kickstarter, part Andreesen-Horowitz o Built by Slock.It, a company originally intended to kickstart an IoT bike lock, but built a kickstarter instead • How it is supposed to work o We all buy into The DAO with ether o The DAO amasses a fund o Contractors come before The DAO with proposals o We all vote on the proposals o If we achieve a quorum, and there is support, proposals get funded o Proposals then return rewards, distributed back out The DAO Complications • Buying in • Voting • Exiting • Modifying the Contract • Payouts The DAO Buy-In • 27-day creation phase • Buy in with ether o 1.00 ether for 100 DAO Tokens for 14 days o +0.05 ether every day for 10 days o 1.50 ether for the last 3 days • Additional gains accumulate in “extraBalance” • Why is there a rising scale? • Do “viral features” have any place in sound investments? The DAO Proposals • Anyone can submit a proposal • Curators pick proposals o Requires a 5 out of 11 signature o 11 members of the Ethereum community, unrelated to SlockIt • The curators’ job description is unclear o Is it to just check identity? o Is it to “protect the DAO”? o The curators are not paid, but they are under substantial legal risk The Voting • Any DAO token holder can vote on a proposal • A proposal is funded if o There is a quorum (sufficient votes) o The majority of the quorum is in favor (voted YES) • Required quorum sizes vary by size of contract o Largest required quorum is 53% • Votes are weighted by a voter’s holdings • But a voter commits The DAO funds (i.e other people’s money) to proposals • Someone who voted cannot exit The DAO The Exit • Cannot just take money out of The DAO o Why? Because of viral/social reasons • To exit, you need to follow a 62-step process: o Initiate a proposal to make yourself a curator o Anyone can vote YES or NO on this proposal o It will likely fail o You can call splitDAO on a failed proposal o A new child-DAO will be created where you are the curator o You can now propose to withdraw funds, approve it as curator, vote on it, and then take the ether back out • Takes 27+7 days • Takes 27 + 7 days Upgrades and Rewards • There is no provision to modify The DAO in place o o No kill switch o No security upgrades o Cannot preserve the full state and change code • The extraBalances can only be spent after The DAO has spent an equivalent amount on proposals • Unclear about the intended behavior with regard to • rewards o Inherited into childDAO’s, but not into grandchildren The DAO Token Markets • DAO tokens can be bought and sold on open markets • Their price will reflect the expected value of future ether flows • Until The DAO funds a proposal, 1 token = 0.01 eth • But in USD terms, the price will fluctuate • The price difference will reflect the uncertainty in the • value of 1 eth, 34 days from now o o E.g. 1 eth = $15 o But 1 dao = $13 • This is a normal consequence of decisions in DAO design Taking Stock • Why was The DAO designed the way it was? o To avoid legal meddling? o To help fund illegal operations? o To create Ponzis? o “Sunny-day thinking” • Aspirational system design • Does The DAO idea even make sense? The Questions • Are the crowds even able to pick winning strategies? o Do fund managers really bring 0 value to the world? • Will we ever reach the quorums required? o Most token holders are passive o The risks of “going with the crowd” without voting • Are the mechanisms in The DAO suited for the tasks that need to be carried out? The Questions • Are the crowds even able to pick winning strategies? o Do fund managers really bring 0 value to the world? • Will we ever reach the quorums required? o Most token holders are passive o The risks of “going with the crowd” without voting • Are the mechanisms in The DAO suited for the tasks that need to be carried out? NO! The Call for a Moratorium • My colleagues and I were alarmed that The DAO managed to collect 11M eth, $220M USD • The internal mechanisms were broken • We rushed a manuscript that detailed the failures, called for a moratorium • The DAO community was convinced and wanted to upgrade The DAO The Hack • While we were in a holding pattern, someone emptied out a substantial fraction of The DAO • The hacker took $50+M worth of ether into a child-DAO called the Dark-DAO • Hacker took advantage of multiple attack vectors o A reentrancy bug in the DAO code o Additional tricks to avoid getting his balance reset o He also voted YES on every other split proposal, to reserve the right to pursue everyone who wanted to split • Hide your kids, hide your pets, there is no safe place The Hack Technicalities What If The DAO Had Not Been Hacked • It still would have been hacked • It was and is deeply broken • The design of voting mechanisms that capture the will of the crowds is a difficult nuanced task • Everybody on the Internet is an expert at three things: o Economics o Game theory o Distributed Systems • The DAO team, and others like it, full of hubris and the Dunning-Kruger effect, are easy targets Guiding Principle • DAO-1.0 is irredeemably broken, but let’s examine how one might build DAO-2.0 in light of what we have learned • The DAO voting mechanisms have to be truthful and strategy-proof o Truthful: token holders vote their true opinion o Strategy-proof: token holders fare best by voting their true opinion • The current mechanisms are broken in multiple ways Affirmative Bias • Every voter has a unique valuation for every proposal o o “Prop #37 will bring in 3% yearly over 3 years” o “Prop #37 will be a net loss, that team can’t pull it off” o “Prop #37 will take us to the moon!” • Ideally, you want everyone to vote their conscience o Positive Expected Value: +EV o Negative Expected Value: -EV • +EV folks are incentivized to vote early • Not so for -EV!!! o Negative votes lock people in • Early votes will be positive, feedback loops work against -EV folks Stalking • A stalker can vote YES on a split proposal and follow a splitter into the child-DAO • Stalker is not going to be the curator, but he can be the dominant (53%) shareholder in the child • Stalker can keep the splitter from taking out his funds • Stalker can then blackmail the splitter • If the splitter splits again, he loses his rewards from the original DAO • SlockIt claimed that the splitter could counterattack, but do you want to play corewars? Ambush • A -EV voter has a disincentive to vote, especially if his vote is not needed • So a big bloc of YES votes can come in at the last possible minute to pass a proposal that initially looked unpassable • This commits other people’s funds to a proposal, even though large fraction is against that proposal • Possible remedy: add time to the clock when the vote outcome changes Token Raid • An attacker can move the price of DAO tokens by o Incentivize people not to split but to sell their tokens o Keep the public from snapping up tokens • She can do this by o Creating social media panic, via stalker attack o Passing a -EV proposal, via ambush attack • The price of tokens will drop, she can short on the way down, and snap up when the attack is over • This is a legitimate manipulation strategy, often seen with penny stocks, except the mechanisms make it easy extraBalance Raid • Attacker forces people to split from The DAO, which leaves behind the extraBalance amount • Currently at 275,000 ether • DAO tokens should trade at 1.02 • If the attacker scares away 95% of investors, DAO will trade at 2.00 Majority Takeover • SlockIt identified and worried about a majority takeover • A voting bloc of 53+% can fund 100% to a 1 proposal • Curators are expected to guard against this o This scenario is specifically cited • But a voting bloc of 53+% can fund 10 proposals of 10% • No principled way to even define the attack, let alone defend against it o DAO defenseless against Soros-style attacks Reward Dilution • The DAO issues reward tokens as proposals pay back into the DAO • Akin to dividends • But the reward token math does not follow any accounting principle • In particular, reward tokens can be diluted even after someone has split off from the DAO Risk-Free Voting • One of the many “race conditions” • Investor votes YES on a proposal, committing funds • Then invokes “unblockMe” before the proposal is executed, and splits off • This allows her to commit the DAO to a proposal without committing her own funds • An attack amplification vector Concurrent Proposal Trap • Voting on any proposal commits the voter until the end of the voting period • Attacker poses a proposal o We have seen “do you believe in God?” for 0 ether • Everyone who votes is banned from splitting until the end of the voting period • Attack amplification vector: push an incendiary proposal with a long voting period, then launch short-fuse attack Independence Assumption • All of the discussion until now assumes that all proposals are independent • Yet in real life, proposals are linked o Funding a cluster of proposals might yield much higher returns than funding them individually • Not an attack, but undesirable • This can yield strategic behavior (i.e. people voting down worthy proposals) even when everyone means well What Have We Learned • The DAO is a fantastic experiment • The experiment has been a huge success • Enormous demand for smart contracts • The Ethereum core has some (well-contained) issues that need to be fixed o The design of a secure smart-contract language is very different from the design of a web-programming language • The DAO is a hot mess Methodological Issues • Why was The DAO designed the way it was? o To avoid legal meddling? o To help fund illegal operations? o To create Ponzis? • Carefully thought-out viral features • Common behaviors were purposefully made difficult • “Sunny-day thinking,” aspirational ideas about best case behaviors • Irresponsible design, no safety mechanisms • Flawed methodology Takeaways • Can we build a $1.2B ecosystem, while spending $0 on basic research and science of smart contracts? • How do we build and vet trustworthy smart contracts? IC3, Initiative on Cryptocurrencies and Smart Contracts http://initc3.org
Open forum / discussion with future security audit team
Hello, I think it would be really positive to have a blog post which lists out who will be auditing the Augur contracts and what their background is. Once we have some knowledge about who these individuals are it would be really encouraging to talk to them over google hangouts. Here are a few of my initial questions:
How would you introduce yourself. What is your technical skill set?
Do you feel that disclosure of your ownership (or lack thereof) of the following tokens is relevant to your role in participating in this audit: Reputation Ether Bitcoin The DAO tokens (previous ownership)
What do you want people to know about your background? Why did you decide to take on this responsibility?
What prior reputation or experience do you have auditing code? What previous experience do you have in the analysis of incentive architecture and game theoretical models?
In your words tell us what is a security audit?
What do you feel is the right methodology to finding potential exploits in smart contract code? Why is this the best approach i.e. better than other competing approaches to finding exploits?
How did you find out the DAO had been hacked?
As soon as you found out it had been hacked what did you do?
Describe in detail what made the hack on the DAO particularly effective in your view.
Can you cite any previously published reddit or blog posts where you contributed to the technical discussion surrounding the analysis of the hack?
What solutions if any did you propose at that time? Give your analysis as to whose insight you felt was most valuable in the days immediately proceeding the hack. Please provide reference to a blogger, or redditor you found had particularly good insight into the problem.
Break Augur apart into its constituent building blocks and describe for us the general types of attacks we expect to see for each section of the architecture.
If you were to grade the DAO team on the level of transparency and honesty in communicating the risks and the efforts that were being taken to mitigate them prior to the hack what grade would they get? (Base your grade only upon pre-hack communications)
Will all of your findings be made available to the general public? How will do you intend to publish your findings? What is your opinion as to the publication of Slockit's security audit?
The DAO had some outspoken critics prior to its failure. Emin Gün Sirer was critical of the efforts of the Slockit team and believed that the hubris of the team contributed to its failure to identify shortcomings in the contract code. How would you have reacted differently when faced with criticism? What do you feel was the major contributing factor to Slockit's failure?
These are just some of the questions I have. Again I put forth an entirely different list of questions for the developers in my previous reddit post. I hope that people wouldn't view these questions as wasted time not spent developing the platform. I think that anyone who holds Reputation should fully educate themselves using the means provided so that the community as a whole can strongly advocate for a platform we believe to be a critical public good which has been absent from society for far too long.
Feeling Much More Comfortable Putting Assets on ETH Blockchain After DAO Incident Within 12 Months
After the DAO incident I feel much more comfortable putting some assets on the blockchain. I can see myself doing that within 12 months. Similar to DigixDAO many fintech startups will start putting a lot of real world assets on the blockchain backed by physical assets. Imo this will be a big thing and one of the first drivers of real adoption. Its just way too lucrative. Real indexes will emerge for this at one point. Going to be a huge industry and create thousands of jobs. Gambling was the breakout app for Bitcoin (Satoshi Dice). DAOs will be our breakthrough. So why does this incident make me feel safer which sounds paradox? I now know the foundation will work on various guidelines for 3rd-parties which they will have to adhere to before getting their approval stamp. There will also be new independent organizations that review DAO code. In fact, I bet one of the first TheNewDAO2.0 backed startups will be such a code audit organization. Basically, any DAO that wants to get funding will have to pass a series of audits. This will be expensive but will be funded by us investors because we are now more aware of the security implications than ever before. Early DAO adopters were quick to complain about the early slockit security proposals, they will see such security proposals in a new light. Ha, the irony.
From: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11701382 grifffgreeen 11 hours ago A DAO is simply software that incentivizes humans to act. Bitcoin is considered the first DAO. This interview explains it pretty well: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pn_7fdmfZY8&feature=youtu.be... The DAO is a new type of DAO that instead inflating it's own currency to incentivize humans to do things, it actually is bootstrapped by the people who Create the tokens during the Creation phase. All DAOs are autonomous. The DAO is run by DAO token holders, they can vote to send money to Proposals. The idea is that the DAO Token Holders want to make a change in the world, but don't have the time or the plan to do it. The DAO and it's Proposals are a special type of software called smart contracts. They can be thought of a digital safe that only releases digital currency according to the rules of the Smart contract. The DAO only sends money out when the DAO Token Holders Vote to agree to it and Proposals will have daily/weekly/monthly payment schedules. Slock.it is hoping that The DAO will choose the Universal Sharing Network to be their flag ship product. We (I work for Slock.it) led the development of The DAO's Code (the Standard DAO Framework ) so it is specifically designed for the project. Slock.it will submit a Proposal to The DAO to build the Universal Sharing Network in 2 weeks asking for The DAO to send an amount of digital currency (ETH) to the Smart contract, that ETH will be sent to Slock.it slowly over time and if at any time The DAO doesn't think Slock.it is doing a good job, it can Fire Slock.it and take back the money that is left in the smart contract. We hope The DAO will be an Ethereum/IoT DAO, and that the DAO Token Holders are excited about that... However we do not know if this will be the case. This is our Proposal Overview If you want to learn more about Slock.it's dream to build a Universal Sharing Network, check out this interview: https://youtu.be/Pn_7fdmfZY8?t=4894 If you want to see Christoph walk thru the code for the Sample proposal watch here: https://youtu.be/5BkQ0te_TA0?t=4587
AutoMod rule for flairing suspicious accounts. /r/Automoderator hasn't been helping me.
Sorry, I know this isn't the most appropriate sub to be asking this question but /AutoModerator hasn't responded to my last post on it. Maybe my AM rules are too intimidating or confusing. I'm trying to make rules which check if a Redditor is over 1 or 2 years old and has less than 100 or 200 karma. The rules I have now have been correctly flairing 1 year and 2 year old accounts but the problem is they also flair accounts younger than 1 year old. My work is down below for you to review. Thanks in advance for any help with this.
--- priority: 59 author: ~flair_css_class (regex, includes-word): ['Bull', 'Bear', 'Gentleman', 'Moon', 'Developer', 'Miner', 'Collector', 'BullWhale', 'BearWhale', 'Ethereum', 'Fan', 'Lover', 'Augur', 'Slocit', 'Gnosis', 'BlockApps', 'BoardRoom', 'DigixGlobal', 'WeiFund', 'Maker', 'HitFin', 'SOC', 'EtherEx', 'Provenance', 'Bitcoin', 'BitShares', 'NuNet', 'Lisk', 'Counterparty', "Redditor for 2 years with less than 200 comment karma."] # if user account still has low karma or young age account_age: "> 730 days" #old account_age: "< 1095 days" #young comment_karma: "> 200" # minimum comment karma satisfy_any_threshold: false set_flair: ["", ""] # then remove flair. overwrite_flair: true action_reason: "Account is over 2 years old with more than 200 karma. Sockpuppet flair removed." --- priority: 58 author: ~flair_css_class (regex, includes): ['Bull', 'Bear', 'Gentleman', 'Moon', 'Developer', 'Miner', 'Collector', 'BullWhale', 'BearWhale', 'Ethereum', 'Fan', 'Lover', 'Augur', 'Slocit', 'Gnosis', 'BlockApps', 'BoardRoom', 'DigixGlobal', 'WeiFund', 'Maker', 'HitFin', 'SOC', 'EtherEx', 'Provenance', 'Bitcoin', 'BitShares', 'NuNet', 'Lisk', 'Counterparty'] # if user is not expert account_age: "> 730 days" #old account_age: "< 1095 days" #young comment_karma: "< 200" # minimum comment karma satisfy_any_threshold: false set_flair: ["Redditor for 2 years with less than 200 comment karma.", "OneWeekOld"] # then remove flair. overwrite_flair: true action_reason: "Account is over 2 years old yet has less than 100 karma." --- priority: 57 author: ~flair_css_class (regex, includes-word): ['Bull', 'Bear', 'Gentleman', 'Moon', 'Developer', 'Miner', 'Collector', 'BullWhale', 'BearWhale', 'Ethereum', 'Fan', 'Lover', 'Augur', 'Slockit', 'Gnosis', 'BlockApps', 'BoardRoom', 'DigixGlobal', 'WeiFund', 'Maker', 'HitFin', 'SOC', 'EtherEx', 'Provenance', 'Bitcoin', 'BitShares', 'NuNet', 'Lisk', 'Counterparty', "Redditor for 1 year with less than 100 comment karma."] # if user is not expert account_age: "> 365 days" account_age: "< 730 days" comment_karma: "> 100" # minimum comment karma satisfy_any_threshold: false set_flair: ["", ""] # then remove flair. overwrite_flair: true action_reason: "Account is over 1 year old and has more than 100 karma. Sockpuppet flair removed." --- priority: 56 author: ~flair_css_class (regex, includes): ['Bull', 'Bear', 'Gentleman', 'Moon', 'Developer', 'Miner', 'Collector', 'BullWhale', 'BearWhale', 'Ethereum', 'Fan', 'Lover', 'Augur', 'Slocit', 'Gnosis', 'BlockApps', 'BoardRoom', 'DigixGlobal', 'WeiFund', 'Maker', 'HitFin', 'SOC', 'EtherEx', 'Provenance', 'Bitcoin', 'BitShares', 'NuNet', 'Lisk', 'Counterparty'] account_age: "> 365 days" account_age: "< 730 days" comment_karma: "< 100" # minimum comment karma satisfy_any_threshold: false set_flair: ["Redditor for 1 year with less than 100 comment karma.", "OneWeekOld"] # then remove flair. overwrite_flair: true action_reason: "Account is over 1 year old yet has less than 100 karma."
Slock.it is the name of a Universal Sharing Network that is hoping to dominate the global financial and asset market, as well as build on the value of tomorrow’s Internet. The company behind Slock has figured out that since two thirds of the world is willing to share its assets to get back a financial reward, with the figure being as high as 94% in China. Der Bitcoin war das Nonplusultra, wenn es um digitales Geld ging. Der Konkurrent Ether könnte das aber nun ändern – auch weil er mehr kann als Bitcoin. Ether übersprang jetzt eine magische ... Bitcoin. Blockchain. Finance. Internet of Things. Headquarters Location Mittweida, Sachsen, Germany; Headquarters Regions European Union (EU) Founded Date Sep 2015; Founders Christoph Jentzsch, Simon Jentzsch, Stephan Tual; Operating Status Active; Last Funding Type Seed; Also Known As slockit, slock; Legal Name Slock.it GmbH; Company Type For Profit; Contact Email [email protected]; Slock.it ... Creating Safe Entry to Web3. To ensure that all individuals can easily and safely access Web3, there must be a user-friendly entry point. Blockchains is developing digital asset management, digital identity management, and blockchain connectivity solutions, which will work in tandem to establish this gateway for users. Bitcoin exchanges all over the world are starting to expand their offering to gain wider recognition. Gatecoin, one of the unsung heroes of the cryptocurrency exchange world, has listed Slock.it and DigixDAO tokens on their exchange platform. Also read: BitcoinAverage Report: Bitcoin Price Hits 2016 High. DigixDAO and Slock.it On Gatecoin . It is always positive to see some of the more ...
Blockchain for Dummies - Part 2 - Bitcoin transactions
Jose Rodriguez from Bitso interviews Griff Green from Slock.it to talk about their company, Blockchain, Ethereum, Bitcoin and the DAO Jose Rodriguez de Bitso entrevista a Griff Green de Slock.it ... Deploying currency locally in spain with bitcoin debit cards Bittrex.com ... Interview with Griff Green - The DAO, SlockIt - GP#10 - Duration: 1:01:56. Szczepan Bentyn 1,545 views. 1:01:56 . # ... Many people are just starting to hear about Bitcoin for the first time, and grappling with all their brain cells to understand the basics of how it might function, let alone its implications ... Hi All, In this short video, we will give you a conceptual understanding of how bitcoin transactions work and why Bitcoin can be considered a valid payment system. In future videos, we will look ... We will talk about the ongoing presale of The DAO, SlockIt and Ethereum. Tips address: Bitcoin: 17bTSc1wxu7LuU5DUz8kBpnhbdzN7KnTWb ETH ...